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Abstract
Purpose: To consider the extent to which the legal recognition of
non-binary gender has the potential to disrupt the gender binary.
Methodology/Approach: This chapter will employ case study as method,
focusing on recent changes to Australian law and policy, which introduce
a third gender category. I rely on the work of queer theorists on normativity and recognition as a theoretical framework and on the work of social
scientists on transgender people as evidence.
Findings: This chapter finds that while there is much to be celebrated about
increasing alternatives to the dominant categories of male and female, the
legal recognition of non-binary gender may in fact serve to conceptually
purge the dominant gender categories of non-conforming elements while
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simultaneously masking the ways in which institutions of regulatory power
continue to demand conformity with normative standards of gender.
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Research Limitations: Since few non-binary individuals in Australia have
adopted the X marker the implications laid out in this paper are speculative.
The experiences of non-binary individuals present an important avenue for
further research.
Practical Implications: I recommend, as an alternative to further gender
classifications, that we should seek to minimize the degree to which membership of a particular gender category is used to distribute rights and
privileges.
Originality/Value of Paper: This chapter advances the literature on nonbinary gender, contributes to existing queer and feminist analyses of the
gender binary and extends work on normativity to legal recognition of
alternative genders.
Keywords: Non-binary gender; transgender; gender binary;
normativity; queer theory; recognition

In April 2014, the highest appeal court in Australia handed down a historic
decision in which it unanimously found that the New South Wales Registrar
of Births, Deaths, and Marriages has the power to register a person’s sex as
“non-specific” (New South Wales Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages v
Norrie, 2014). The decision comes at a time when non-binary people are being
increasingly recognized in Australian law and policy. In certain circumstances,
individuals are now permitted to record their sex/gender as something other
than male or female in passports (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(Cth), n.d.), in birth certificates issued by the Australia Capital Territory
(Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997 (ACT), s 24) and New
South Wales (NSW Registrar v Norrie, 2014), and in personal records held by
Australian Government departments and agencies (Australian Government,
2013b). In this chapter, I argue that while there is much to be celebrated about
increasing alternatives to dichotomous gender categories, the legal recognition of non-binary gender may in fact be interpreted as bolstering the very
dichotomous system of gender it purports to undermine.
In the following sections, I explore the implications of formal legal
recognition of non-binary gender in Australian law and policy. Initially,
I provide some background to the discussion by tracing the history of the
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gender binary in Australian law and the recent activist and policy responses,
which have sought to have non-binary gender recognized in law. I then outline the theoretical context for the subsequent discussion, being the work of
Michael Warner (2000) on normativity and Dean Spade (2011) on legal recognition. In the subsequent section, I argue that the X category in Australian
law and policy enacts what I describe as a politics of containment in which
non-binary people are identified, stabilized, and purged from the dominant
gender categories. Through an exploration of the ways in which the X legal
classification is reliant on medical discourses, which pathologize non-binary
gender, and the operation of classification systems, which produce mutually
exclusive categories, I argue that the X marker is pathologizing and essentiali
zing in ways that are harmful for both non-binary people and people with
intersex conditions. In the next section, I suggest that the introduction of
the X marker not only does little to practically disrupt the gender binary
but may in fact exacerbate it by creating an illusion of equality while institutions of regulatory power continue to marginalize many non-binary trans
people. In this section, I outline some of the institutions of regulatory power
that demand conformity with standards of binary gender, including identity documentation, marriage, and sex-segregated facilities. I ultimately recommend that rather than introducing further gender categories we should
instead work toward minimizing the degree to which membership of a particular gender category is used to distribute rights and privileges. To the extent
that knowledge of gender is necessary (e.g., for monitoring affirmative action
policies), I suggest that self-identification should be the determining factor.
I conclude by exploring some preliminary possibilities for how this might be
implemented in law and policy, with suggestions for further research.

The gender binary and non-binary gender
The division of people into two rigidly fixed, natural and mutually exclusive genders is a key organizing principle of Western societies (e.g., Butler,
1990; Fausto-Sterling, 2000a; Lorber, 2005). At birth, children are definitively sorted into one of these categories on the basis of the perception of
their external genitalia. Within this framework, people assigned male at birth
are expected to identify as men and be masculine, whereas people assigned
female at birth as expected to identify as women and be feminine. The law
functions as a key site at which these gender norms are “actively consolidated
into institutional practice” (Meadow, 2010, p. 820; see also Greenberg, 1999;
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Kolbe, 2009; Sharpe, 2002; Spade, 2008). In a 1968 decision of the Civil Court
of the City of New York, for example, Judge Pecora stated
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It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s
land’ for those individuals who are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female’. Yet the standard
is much too fixed for such far-out theories. (Re Anonymous, 1968, p. 838)

Similarly, in the Australian case of R v Harris (1988), the Court considered
the submission that even if it were to decide that a trans individual had not
undergone surgery to a sufficient extent to be considered a woman at law, it
was nonetheless “open for the Court to say that there is a third state” that
she could fall into (1988, p. 170). Justice Matthews ultimately rejected the submission, stating, “I can see no place in the law for a ‘third sex’,” noting that
such a category would “cause insuperable difficulties in the application of
existing legal principles” and “relegate transsexuals to a legal ‘no man’s land’”
(1988, p. 194).
This case law, however, fails to account for the diversity of bodies and
identities outside of the male/female binary. Some transgender1 people do not
identify solely as one binary gender or the other. Individuals who fall under
the genderqueer or non-binary umbrella, for example, may “have a gender
which is neither male nor female and may identify as both male and female at
one time, as different genders at different times, as no gender at all, or dispute
the very idea of only two genders” (Richards et al., 2016; see also, Bolton &
Kean, 2015; Nestle, Wilchins, & Howell, 2002). For example, in a 2015 US
survey of trans people, more than one-third (35%) of respondents indicated
that their gender identity was best described as non-binary or genderqueer
(James et al., 2016).
In addition to affecting non-binary trans people, who are the focus of
this chapter, the dichotomous sex/gender system has implications for people with intersex conditions. Intersex is a term which, although contested,
is generally used to describe “the state of being born with a combination of characteristics (e.g., genital, gonadal, and/or chromosomal) that
are typically presumed to be exclusively male or female” (G. Davis, 2015,
p. 2). Intersex activists and academics, however, have long expressed concerns about trans and non-binary activists conflating issues of identity and
biology and appropriating the language of intersex for their own purposes
(Dreger & Herndon, 2009). This chapter therefore endeavors to keep nonbinary gender identity and intersex status analytically distinct, except to
the extent that sex and gender are already conflated in Australia law and
policy. Birth certificates and passports, for example, use the language of sex,
despite the fact that in circumstances of changing a classification it would
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be more appropriate to use the language of gender. Where sex and gender
have been conflated with implications for intersex people in this chapter, it
will be noted throughout.
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Recent Developments in Australian Law and Policy
In response to the prevailing dichotomous gender structure of the Australian
legal system some have advocated for the recognition of non-binary gender
in law, with increasing success. In 2010, for example, self-identified eunuch
Norrie commenced proceedings against the NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths
and Marriages, who had denied Norrie a recognized details certificate2 with
sex [sic] listed as “not specified.” On appeal, the High Court unanimously
found that that the Act recognizes that “a person’s sex may be indeterminate”
(2014, para. 46) and that the Registrar has the power to record an individual’s
sex as non-specific (NSW Registrar v Norrie, 2014). Norrie’s case thus represents a historic decision which forms part of a domestic and international
trend3 toward broader legal recognition of the third sex/gender categories. For
example, just a month before the final decision of the High Court in NSW
Registrar v Norrie (2014) was handed down, the Australian Capital Territory
also introduced an X classification for birth certificates (Births, Deaths and
Marriages Registration Act 1997 (ACT), s 24).
At the level of policy, the recommendations of the Australian Human
Rights Commission’s Sex Files Report (2009) have prompted more inclusive
passport and record-keeping policies. In 2011, the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade announced a number of changes to its passport policies, including allowing a person to obtain a passport with sex [sic] listed
as X (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Cth), n.d.). Likewise, in
July 2013, the Australian Government released the Australian Government
Guidelines on the Recognition of Sex and Gender which outlines the sex/gender classification policies that apply to federal government departments and
agencies (Australian Government, 2013b). The Guidelines state that “[w]here
sex and/or gender information is collected and recorded in a personal record,
individuals should be given the option to select M (male), F (female) or
X (indeterminate/unspecified/intersex)” (Australian Government, 2013b,
para. 19).
Although the legal recognition of non-binary gender has never been the
subject of widespread campaigning in Australia, the relatively quiet introduction of the X marker has been celebrated by many as a disruption to the dominant view of gender as binary and a significant win for non-binary rights and
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recognition (e.g., Germon, 2014; Pitts, 2014). On top of a growing literature
of scholarly critique of the gender binary (e.g., Butler, 1990; Fausto-Sterling,
2000a; Lorber, 2005) some scholars have also specifically argued that the
third gender category “challenges the rigidity of the gender binary system”
(Monro, 2005, p. 15). For example, in a slightly different context, being the
third category of restroom, Terry Kogan argues: “The very existence of a
restroom labeled ‘Other’ forces all persons, especially those who choose to use
the restrooms labelled ‘Men’ or ‘Women,’ to question their default assumptions about sex and gender” (1997, p. 1253).
While Kogan and others like him make important and persuasive arguments for the disruptive potential of the third gender categories, in this chapter I argue for caution. In particular, I suggest that the third category may
instead be interpreted as bolstering the very dichotomous system of gender it purports to undermine. Before doing so, however, I turn to the work
of Michael Warner (2000) on normativity and Dean Spade (2011) on legal
recognition.

Normativity and recognition
Michael Warner (2000) attributes normativity to the invention and spread
of statistics in the nineteenth century. Within this usage, the term “normal”
means simply within the common statistical range. However, modern medicine developed around the notion that statistical methods could be used to
discover natural laws such that “normal came to mean right, proper, healthy”
(e.g., the average body temperature of the population is the healthy body temperature) (Warner, 2000, p. 57). Thus the statistical norm is often confused
for the evaluative norm, being a “standard criterion of value” (Warner, 2000,
p. 56). This understanding of normativity is reminiscent of Foucault’s (1978)
familiar notions disciplinary power and biopower, which he likewise theorizes as emerging during the nineteenth century. During this time, the state’s
sovereign power to put someone to death became “supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life” as exemplified by
the newfound observation of birthrates and public health (Foucault, 1978,
p. 140). Key to this new mode of power was the invention of certain categories of improper and unhealthy people (e.g., the homosexual, the criminal,
the hysterical woman) who in turn become the basis against which norms of
(im)proper behavior were enforced, evaluated, and monitored. Thus, for both
Warner and Foucault normal came to be the standard against which one disciplines or evaluates oneself.
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For stigmatized groups, such as queer people, the appeal to or insistence
upon normality is a convenient response to the common perception of sexual
and gender deviance as pathological (Warner, 2000). Warner argues, however,
that this simply produces a “hierarchy of shame” within queer politics, which
positions the “happily coupled veterinarians in a suburban tract home” as
the “more respectable, easier to defend” constituency of the movement (2000,
p. 49). Warner attributes this hierarchy of shame to “the structuring conditions
of gay and lesbian politics,” being the tension between the internal standard
of the stigmatized queer constituency on the one side, and the external standard of the dominant culture on the other side (2000, p. 49). He points out that
queers, like other stigmatized groups, have been tempted to believe that “the
way to overcome stigma was to win acceptance by the dominant culture,” and
it is therefore unsurprising that those who are most concerned with achieving respect and recognition might wish that “their peers in shame would be
a little less queer, a little more decent” (Warner, 2000, p. 50). The dilemma
of the appeal to normal is that it “merely throws shame on those who stand
farther down the ladder of respectability,” since it seems impossible to think
of oneself as normal without thinking of another as pathological (Warner,
2000, p. 60). Importantly, these hierarchies often reinforce other “hierarchies
of respectability” based on gender variance, race, class, and urban geography
(Warner, 2000, p. 67).
Trans scholar Dean Spade likewise argues that “legal declarations
of ‘equality’ are often tools for maintaining stratifying social and economic arrangements” (2011, p. 14). He argues that lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender (LGBT) law reform agendas that “chang[e] what the law
explicitly says about a group,” such as anti-discrimination in the workplace,
military inclusion, and same-sex marriage, seek inclusion and recognition
in dominant institutions without fundamentally challenging the systemic
inequalities these institutions are based on (Spade, 2011, p. 124). Instead,
like Warner, Spade (2011) argues that demands for legal recognition and
inclusion result in certain sub-sections of the group being targeted as undeserving and pursuing the needs of the favored group who are, in turn, taken
to represent the whole. He furthermore points to the ways in which administrative legal systems, such as health care, housing, and education, “create
structured insecurity and (mal)distribute life chances across populations” by
using purportedly neutral criteria to distribute resources and opportunities
in ways which reproduce racist, sexist, homophobic, ableist, xenophobic, and
transphobic outcomes (Spade, 2011, p. 29). By subscribing to a neoliberal
agenda of recognition and inclusion then, the LGBT law reform work not
only alienates those most affected by structured inequality but also in fact
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further “endangers and marginalizes” (Spade, 2011, p. 15) them by perpetuating the harmful logics of these systems and “contributing to their illusion
of fairness and equality” (Spade, 2011, p. 124).
Bearing in mind Warner and Spade’s astute analysis of the trouble with
appealing to normal in the pursuit of legal recognition, it is necessary to ask
whether certain hierarchies of shame and structured inequality are also being
reproduced in the context of the legal recognition of non-binary gender.
In what ways, for example, is non-binary gender made more respectable,
more palatable to the dominant culture in the process of recognition? Does
the legal recognition of non-binary gender affect the administrative distribution of resources? Are there versions of non-binary gender and gender nonconformity that are further marginalized in the process of recognition and,
if so, does this correspond to other intersecting hierarchies of respectability
along the lines of race, class, disability, and national origin? I consider these
issues in the following sections of this chapter.

Containing the threat
In this section, I argue that the X category in Australian law and policy enacts
a politics of containment in which non-conforming elements are identified,
essentialized, and purged from the dominant gender categories. As Towle and
Morgan contend, the third gender category “functions to protect ‘first’ and
‘second’ categories from becoming analytically muddled or contaminated” by
implying that the dominant gender categories are “inviolable and unproblematic” (2002, pp. 484–485). In this section, I trace the ways in which the legal
classification of non-binary gender represented in the X marker is reliant on
medical discourses that pathologize non-binary gender. I observe that the
gendered possibilities outside the binary have become explicitly recognized
by the medical establishment at the same time as the legal classification of X
has emerged to contain the gendered excess represented therein. Non-binary
people are thus brought into the dominant gender order and simultaneously
pathologized as other within it. Given that classification systems rely on the
assumption that categories are both internally coherent and mutually exclusive from one another, the X category functions not only to differentiate nonbinary gender from the dominant gender categories but also to obscure the
substantial differences within the X category. As elaborated below, X as a
legal category thus serves to essentialize non-binary gender in ways that are
not only contrary to experiences of many non-binary people but also in ways
that are harmful for people with intersex conditions.
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Pathologization
As outlined previously, the only two Australian states or territories that
allow a person to change the sex [sic] on their birth certificate (or similar) to
something other than male or female are the Australian Capital Territory
and New South Wales. In each of these circumstances, psychological and/or
medical evidence in the form of a letter or statutory declaration from a medical practitioner or psychologist is required to allow the amendment.4 As such
psychological and medical professionals are installed as gatekeepers to nonbinary gender recognition, consistent with a long history of psycho-medical
intervention into trans lives (Feinberg, 1996; Stone, 2006).
While historically the treatment of transgender people has not accommodated for identifications outside of the binary gender categories, recent
changes to diagnostic criteria used in the treatment of trans people have
begun to acknowledge the existence of non-binary people. In May 2013,
the diagnosis Gender Dysphoria replaced the former diagnosis of Gender
Identity Disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-5) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, pp. 451–459). Among
other changes, the entry for Gender Dysphoria in the DSM-5 now observes
that “[e]xperienced gender may include alternative gender identities beyond
binary stereotypes” and acknowledges options beyond only the “other gender” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 453). As such, although
people with gender expressions and identities outside the binary have a long
history of being pathologized and marginalized by medical systems, this represents perhaps the first time that they have been explicitly marked out and
named in the pathologizing processes represented by the DSM.
Other trans scholars have convincingly argued that earlier versions of
these diagnostic criteria have been instrumental in containing and pathologizing gender non-conforming people who generate friction against dominant gender categories. Spade (2006), for example, argues that normatively
gendered subjects are created through the process of distinguishing them
from non-normatively gendered subjects who are in turn produced through
relevant diagnostic criteria. Using Foucault’s notion that a category of deviation produces a “mill of speech” for identifying “ill” behavior (1978, p. 21),
Spade (2006) argues that trans-related diagnostic criteria provide a regulatory
structure that ensures compliance with normative gender through surveillance. The medical model also provides apparent treatment for violations of
gender norms by allowing trans people with appropriately normative crossgender expressions to access hormones and surgeries so that they can pass as
non-transgender people without disrupting the binary. As such, the creation
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of the diagnosis supports the notion that there are two distinct gender groupings, which usually contain everyone but are occasionally wrongly assigned
and therefore need to be rectified in order to re-establish the norm. This serves
to “privatize” and “de-politicize” (Spade, 2006, p. 317) gender such that the
focus is on deviant gender performances and never on the compulsory nature
of the gender binary, which is itself left intact.
For the most part, the diagnostic criteria for Gender Dysphoria in the
DSM-5 continues this tradition of pathologizing transgender people and
facilitating medical interventions that bring trans people into the dichotomous gender order. This is evident in the fact that alternatives to the “other
gender” are relegated to parentheses and a passing note only. Nonetheless the
DSM-5 presents an interesting development in that it creates some space for
non-normatively gendered subjects to exist outside of their assigned binary
gender without having to be brought into the opposite gender. I suggest in the
next section, however, that the third legal gender category functions to contain
the threat that this presents for the dominant gendered order. Thus, although
the non-normatively gendered possibilities represented by the DSM-5 have
the potential to blur the boundary between male and female, the introduction
of the third legal gender ensures that non-binary gender is defined, delimited,
and contained into its own category, ensuring that the existing categories of
male and female remain uncontaminated. It is to the categorizing impulse of
law, and the implications of this, that I now turn.
Legal Classification
The law, with its tendencies toward identification, classification, and regulation, is well-equipped to perform the kind of containment necessary to purify
the male/female binary of undesirable elements. The law’s impulse toward
categorization arises as a result of its need to “simplify complex concepts”
(Grenfell & Hewitt, 2012, p. 761) in order to apply standardized legal reasoning. The work of Bowker and Star (1999) on the political and ethical dimensions of classification systems is useful for understanding the implications of
this process. They remind us that while classification methods purport only
to group pre-existing types of things in a manner that is neutral and natural,
the process in fact does the ideological work of shaping the world (Bowker
& Star, 1999). While classification systems are universal cognitive coping
mechanisms, it is nevertheless a mistake to assume that they sort things
along obvious or natural lines (Bowker & Star, 1999). Through an exploration of, for example, race classifications in apartheid South Africa and health
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classifications made by medical professionals, Bowker and Star (1999) reveal
the ways in which classification systems privilege some distinctions as natural
and significant while others are entirely ignored, with implications for the
populations who are produced and regulated in the process.
Importantly, these classification systems also rely on assumptions of similarity and difference. Meadow reminds us, in a discussion of (binary) classifications of transgender people by US courts, that to function properly
classification systems must “denote mutually exclusive groups” (2010, p. 817).
For Meadow, the effect of this requirement is that “[o]bjects that cut across
categories must be placed in one box or another” (2010, p. 817). I suggest,
furthermore, that an alternative (and additional) way of coping with objects
that cut across categories is to create the third category such that all three
categories are mutually exclusive from each other.
However, this framework for understanding non-binary gender as fundamentally and obviously different from each of the binary genders is inconsistent with the lived realities of many gender diverse people. One sociological
study of transgender people, for example, found that 92% of respondents
typically presented themselves as a man or as a woman in public and hoped
to appear as such, despite the fact that only 67% of respondents identified themselves in binary terms (as either a man, woman, male, or female)
(E. C. Davis, 2009). Given the limitations on publicly available gender categories, trans people are engaged in creating coherence for both themselves and
others in situations where it may not be possible to convey the complexities of
the gendered self or where it may be dangerous to do so (E. C. Davis, 2009).
As such, the X marker functions to erase much that is disruptive about gender
non-conformity, being its multiplicity and incoherence, by imposing norms
of essentialism and stability.
The homogenizing effects of the X marker are not only evident in the
extent to which the category obscures differences among non-binary people
but also in the extent to which it problematically conflates non-binary gender
and intersex status, instead subsuming them within one undifferentiated category. The draft version of the Australian Government Guidelines (Australian
Government, 2013a) allowed people to adopt an X marker in circumstances
where they had an intersex condition but not where they were trans. After
submissions by non-binary trans people, the category was widened such that
the X category in the final form of the Guidelines was described to mean
“indeterminate/intersex/unspecified.” An uninformed reader would likely
assume that the terms “indeterminate,” “intersex,” and “unspecified” are synonymous. As such, it is arguable that non-binary trans people have simply
been subsumed within a pre-existing intersex category, erasing the substantial
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differences between them. As discussed previously, intersex is congenital and
relates to sex in the sense of genetic, chromosomal, and hormonal factors
(G. Davis, 2015), whereas transgender refers to a conflict between gender
identity and gender assigned at birth (Burdge, 2007). Locating people with
intersex and non-binary trans people within one category, therefore, misses
that the vast majority of people with intersex identify as either male or female
(National LGBTI Health Alliance, 2013), and that “that intersex experiences
and advocacy may become muddied, co-opted, or misguided in the conflation
of transgender and intersex” (Dreger & Herndon, 2009, p. 213). By subsuming non-binary and intersex people into one undifferentiated category the
X marker thus not only functions to contain the apparent threat posed by
non-binary trans people and people with intersex to the stability and coherence of the gender binary, but in doing so dismisses as irrelevant the range of
actual experiences within this apparently homogenous group.
In this part, I have argued for the normalizing effects of appealing to the
dominant culture for respect and recognition. In particular, I have argued
through the interdependent processes of pathologization and classification
much of what is troublesome about gender non-conformity becomes erased
or otherwise eliminated as gendered experiences outside the binary are identified, stabilized, and essentialized. That which is conceptually salvageable
within the dominant gendered order becomes classified and normalized, while
that which is unable to be assimilated remains incomprehensible. Warner’s
“hierarchies of respectability” (2000, p. 67) are thus reinscribed, privileging those non-binary people who can more readily approximate normalcy.
At the same time, the privileged status of the dichotomous gender categories
remains intact as, insofar as non-binary gender is brought into the dominant gender order, it continues to be pathologized and distinguished from
the binary gender categories. Non-normative genders are thus purged from
the dominant categories and any threat they pose to the dichotomous gender
order is conceptually contained.

The persistence of the gender
binary in administrative law
In this part, I suggest that while one legal discourse may formally recognize non-binary gender, the administrative legal discourses which determine
access to services and resources make little to no space for non-binary gender. In these circumstances, people who elect to have an X identifier on
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their documents would likely be marked for further scrutiny, gender policing, and harassment. I suggest then that the introduction of the X marker
not only does little to practically disrupt the gender binary but may in fact
exacerbate it by creating an illusion of equality while institutions of regulatory power continue to leave them bereft in a system with a limited form of
citizenship. In this section, I outline some of the institutions of regulatory
power that demand conformity with standards of binary gender, including
identity documentation, marriage, and sex-segregated facilities. I conclude
this section by suggesting that, while legal recognition may be an option
for those non-binary people who are otherwise already served by regulatory systems and prevailing socio-economic arrangements, it would likely
compound the harms perpetuated against those who are the most marginalized at the intersection of race, class, disability status, employment, and
immigration status.
Identity Documents
Proof of identity is required for a multitude of everyday transactions.
Whereas for most people providing identity documents will be a fairly routine matter, for those people with a lack of consistent identity documents it
can have wide-ranging impacts on their participation in the social, economic,
and political aspects of civic life. In most of the literature relating to trans
identity documents to date, scholars and commentators have drawn attention
to the lack of consistency in policies for changing gender records from male
to female, or vice-versa (e.g., Meadow, 2010; Spade, 2008). In Australia, for
example, passports, health-care cards, and social security are managed at a
federal/national level, while birth certificates and driver’s licenses are managed at a state and territory level. On top of this, non-government and private organizations, such as banks and universities, tend to develop their own
conflicting policies for allowing people to change their gender marker.
In these circumstances, trans scholars and activists have advocated for lowering the thresholds for allowing gender reclassification, including abolishing
stringent and unnecessary surgeries requirements. With the introduction of
the X marker by only some administrative institutions in Australia, however,
non-binary people who want to be recognized as such face the impossibility
of carrying consistent identity documents with which to prove their identity.
Although federal passport policy and the Australia Government Guidelines
now allow for the X identifier, only two of the eight states and territories
allow sex [sic] to be recorded as something other than male or female on
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birth certificates (or equivalent), and even then, only in limited circumstances.
While the NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages has the power to
record the sex [sic] of a person as “non-specific” following the decision in
NSW Registrar v Norrie (2014), it can only do so where the individual has
undergone a “surgical procedure” involving the “alteration of reproductive organs” (Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW),
s 32A(b)). Given the fact that surgery involving the reproductive organs is
dangerous, expensive, and considered unnecessary for many trans and nonbinary people, having a “non-specific” sex designation on a birth certificate
remains a slim possibility for the overwhelming majority of non-binary trans
people in NSW.
Spade has remarked on the “the economic and political impairment” that
arises in the US context from being “inconsistently classified in the [gender]
rule matrix” (2008, p. 747). For many trans people, being unable to provide
basic identification documents that consistently show their current name and
gender means that they are outed in the process of applying for jobs, housing, and finance, as well as a myriad of other common transactions. Similarly
in the 2007 Australian TranzNation survey, 32.4% of participants reported
that they had received lesser treatment due to issues regarding name/gender
on documents and 31.6% reported that they had been refused employment
or denied a promotion in an existing job (Couch et al., 2007). On top of
that, 15% had been refused bank finance, 12% had been refused housing, and
26.9% had been refused services in other areas (Couch et al., 2007).
Sex-Segregation
The fact that non-binary genders are generally not recognized is exemplified by the abundance of sex-segregated institutions in Australian society.
Although trans people who fall within the gender binary are increasingly
gaining access to appropriate sex-segregated facilities, non-binary people
not only fail to gain access to services that affirm their gender but also may
be left in a legal no man’s land. The most notable of these institutions in the
Australian context is marriage, which continues to be defined under Section
5 of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) as “the union of a man and a woman to
the exclusion of all others,” despite several attempts in recent years to introduce same-sex marriage.5 Although there is no case law about marriages
involving non-binary people, there has been one reported Australian case
where the court has considered the validity of a marriage involving a person
with intersex, which found that the marriage was void on the basis that he

BK-EMP-AGR_VOL24-170240.indb 240

10/10/17 11:24 AM

Downloaded by University of Wollongong At 20:31 14 February 2018 (PT)

Non-Binary Gender Markers in Australian Law and Policy

241

was “neither man nor woman, but a combination of both” (In the Marriage
of C & D, 1979, p. 640). The case was subsequently overturned on the basis
that, among other things, a person with intersex was entitled to “choose
their sex and marry” (Attorney-General for the Commonwealth v Kevin, 2003,
para. 231). While the conflation of trans and intersex are problematic for
the reasons outlined earlier, given the conflation of sex and gender within
the popular imaginary and the legal system in particular, such case law is
nonetheless illuminative. It remains to be seen whether a person who refuses
to choose a sex (or gender) would be permitted to enter into or remain in a
marriage, but given the current wording of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) it
seems unlikely.
Other sex-segregated facilities may also impact on a non-binary person’s
sense that they are not recognized by the legal system. These include prisons, homeless shelters, drug treatment centers, foster care group homes,
domestic violence shelters, and public toilets. Given rates of job and housing
discrimination experienced by trans people, they may have an increased need
to access sex-segregated services. For example, the 2015 US Trans Survey
found that respondents reported high rates of experience in the underground
economy, with 20% having participated in sex work, drug sales, and other
work that is currently criminalized at some point in their lives (James et al.,
2016). Furthermore, 12% of respondents had experienced homelessness in
the past year due to being transgender (James et al., 2016).
Unequal Distribution
In the previous part, I have explored various legal and administrative discourses that maintain a binary view of gender in order to demonstrate that
while one legal discourse may formally recognize non-binary gender, the
administrative and legal discourses that determine their access to services and
resources make little to no space for non-binary gender. As a result of this
tension, it is evident that the introduction of the third gender category serves
not only to obscure the persistence and prevalence of the gender binary in
regulatory legal systems but also grants non-binary people a limited form of
citizenship and impedes upon their ability to access certain social, economic,
and political opportunities.
This is not to say that no non-binary people will adopt the X marker. I
suggest, however, that the benefits of non-binary legal recognition will be
unequally distributed. As Spade points out, it is trans people who experience
the most extreme vulnerability at the intersection of race, class, disability
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status, employment, and immigration status, who are most likely to have
“aspects of their lives are directly controlled by legal and administrative
systems of domination… that employ rigid gender binaries” such as prisons
and homeless shelters (2011, p. 13). As such, the 2015 US Trans Survey
reported that although 30% of all respondents had experienced homelessness during their lifetime, the rate of homelessness was significantly higher
for transgender women of color, including American Indian (59%), Black
(51%), multiracial (51%), and Middle Eastern (49%) women (James et al.,
2016). Similarly, while 2% of all respondents reported being assaulted or
attacked when presenting inconsistent identification documents, Middle
Eastern respondents were almost five times as likely (9%) to report experiencing this, American Indians were three times as likely (6%), and Black
respondents were twice as likely (4%) (James et al., 2016). Although these
statistics are specific to race-relations in the United States, there is nothing to suggest that this general trend is not replicated in Australia. I argue,
therefore, that while most non-binary people who adopt the X marker
would be impaired by a system which otherwise does not recognize them,
it is those non-binary people who are otherwise marginalized by systems of
dominance and control along the lines of race, class, and disability status
who would suffer the greatest disadvantages in doing so. Thus, in appealing
to recognition from the dominant culture Warner’s “hierarchies of respectability” are further reinscribed (2000, p. 67).

Recommendations
In this chapter, I have argued that, given the normalizing effects of appealing
to the dominant culture for recognition, the third legal gender category may be
interpreted as bolstering the very dichotomous system of gender it purports
to undermine. As an alternative to this, I suggest that we should seek to minimize the degree to which membership of a particular gender category is used
to distribute rights and privileges. In this section, I briefly review a number
of state interests that apparently justify classifying and discriminating on the
basis of gender including protection against identity fraud, safety and comfort, opposition to same-sex marriage, effective governmental planning (particularly in relation to public health), and monitoring participation in public
activity for the purposes of affirmative action. I conclude that, for the most
part, the benefits to the state do not outweigh the harms perpetuated against
gender minorities, including non-binary trans people. To this end, following
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other queer, trans, and feminist scholars, I recommend that we instead move
toward “deliberate degendering” (Lorber, 2005) or “dis-establish[ing] gender
from the state” (Currah, 2006, p. 24; see also, Spade, 2008, 2011).
To their credit, the Australia Government Guidelines are already cognizant of the unnecessary collection of gender data. As such, the Guidelines
state that departments and agencies “must not collect information unless it
is necessary for, or directly related to, one or more of the agency’s functions
or activities” (Australian Government, 2013b, para. 29). While this is a step
in the right direction, I predict that the pervasiveness of binary gender and
its social significance will make it difficult for decision-makers to critically
assess whether gender categories are truly required and whether the necessity
of gender categories outweighs their oppressive nature. In any case, I recommend that degendering should take place on a significantly larger scale than
that implied in by the Australian Government Guidelines, arguing in favor of
an end of gender designation as a tool of identification, the degendering of
marriage and moving toward reducing sex-segregated facilities. To the extent
that knowledge of gender is necessary, I suggest that self-identification should
be the determining factor.
Identity Fraud
Many commentators have claimed that gender has limited value as a predictor of appearance for the purposes of identification (Bennett, 2014; FaustoSterling, 2000b; Spade, 2008). Ezie argues that “given the sheer variety of
bodies (for example, stocky, lanky, curvy, flat-chested)” that exist within
the categories of male and female, gender is a “fatally imprecise” identifier
(2011, p. 191). Spade (2008), likewise, has charted the significant variation
in gender reclassification policies across agencies and states in the United
States in order to demonstrate the instability of gender as a category of
identity verification. The fact that in one jurisdiction an individual needs a
penis (phalloplasty) to be reclassified as male, while in another jurisdiction
he needs to remove his uterus, ovaries, and breasts but does not need a penis
attests to the fact that gender is “unstable and unreliable as an indicator
of any particular ‘truth’ across the entire system” (Spade, 2008, p. 803). In
an age where photographs, digital signatures, retinal scans, blood type, and
other technology exist to identify people more accurately, gender markers
are no longer necessary or useful for the purposes of correctly identifying
individuals.
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Safety
Sex-segregation, and its corollary, binary gender classification, are often justified
on the basis of the safety and comfort of primarily non-transgender women.
However, commentators have questioned whether the aims of sex-segregation
in bathrooms, shelters, group homes, and prisons are best met by sex-segregation (Spade, 2008). For example, research on a series of experimental genderintegrated prisons, which were established in the 1970s and 1980s in the United
States, found that violence within the facilities was significantly reduced, especially amongst men and including sexual assault (Smykla, 1979). As such, some
have argued that personal security is a function primarily of supervision, not
segregation, and that prisoners are more vulnerable in poorly supervised sexsegregated environments than in well-supervised co-ed facilities (Herbert, 1985).
Sanders and Stryker (2016) make a similar argument in the context of public
bathrooms that safety is a function of communal space and increased occupancy
rather than segregation. This is not to diminish the very real fears of discomfort,
harassment, and assault experienced by people, often women, in relation to gender-integrated facilities, but rather to question whether there are other policies
that might produce more meaningful safety measures without also harming
trans and non-binary people. Further research in this area is required, but it
may begin with consideration of, for example, locked, single-stall bathrooms or
increased security in residential facilities (see Sanders & Stryker, 2016).
Same-Sex Marriage
In NSW Registrar v Norrie (2014), the High Court pointed to the state’s continuing investment in binary gender categories for the purpose of marriage, stating
that “[t]he chief, perhaps the only, case where the sex [sic] of the parties to the
relationship is legally significant is marriage” (2014, para. 42). Many commentators have identified the homophobia inherent in transgender jurisprudence, with
much of the case law on the issue of gender classifications arising in relation to
the validity of a marriage (Cruz, 2010; Sharpe, 1997, 2002). I suggest, however,
that homophobia is a poor excuse for maintaining restrictive and harmful gender
classifications in circumstances where they are otherwise of limited usefulness.
Public Health
Spade (2008) submits that one area, that may benefit from retaining the
use of gender data would be public health. It is necessary, however, to consider what assumptions are being made about the work that gender does in
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this context. For a government program interested in tracking uterine cancer
rates, for example, it may be more useful to gather information about people
with uteruses rather than people classified as females since not all of these
people will have uteruses (Spade, 2008). While it makes sense to record information about sex and gender as part of an individual’s medical history, there
is no reason why this should be a primary part of their record or why it should
act as an obstacle to obtaining certain treatments.
Affirmative Action
It may be necessary for institutions to refrain from degendering in specific
circumstances, particularly in relation to evaluating efforts to redress discrimination against women and trans people (Lorber, 2005). In these circumstances, however, data should be collected only to the degree that it
is necessary to achieve these aims. Although it is beyond the scope of this
paper to set out in detail how every area of law and policy should go about
degendering, I suggest that where it is necessary to know a person’s gender,
this should be based on self-identification, and preferably using one’s own
language. Where this kind of self-identification is not an option for practical
reasons (e.g., the collection of quantitative data), measures should be taken
to ensure that categories are fluid and non-essentialist (see Westbrook &
Saperstein, 2015 for recommendations). This may include giving individuals
a variety of options, seeking regular feedback in relation to what categories
should be offered, making answering optional and allowing people to select
more than one gender. In some circumstances, such as data collection in
relation to affirmative action policies, it may be more appropriate to allow
people to opt in or out of relevant categories, for example, to ask whether
people identify in whole or in part as women. The issue of how best to implement a degendering of public policy presents an important avenue for further research in this area.

Conclusion
While recent changes to Australian law and policy have been celebrated by many
as a win for the non-binary trans people and a disruption to the dichotomous
gender system, this chapter instead approaches these developments with caution.
As governments and institutions deploy policies that purport to recognize nonbinary trans people, it is crucial to map not only the ways in which the gender
system is complicated but also the ways that system is sustained and reinscribed
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through these policies. In this chapter, I have outlined the ways in which nonbinary trans people continue to be marginalized, pathologized, and excluded
from civic life in spite of their legal recognition and argue, in fact, that this is a
necessary effect of appealing to the dominant culture for inclusion. As I have
demonstrated in this chapter, processes of legal classification and administrative
governance continue to uphold the privileged status of normative, dichotomous
gender, relegating non-binary gender instead to the pathologized third category
with access to a limited form of citizenship. Given the failures of recognition,
and its normalizing effects, I recommend instead that we do away with gendered
categories as a mode of distributing rights and privileges altogether. In doing
so, I advocate not only for a world in which a diversity of gendered experiences
outside the binary can thrive but also for reducing the degree to which the state
regulates and controls the lives of all sex and gender minorities.

Notes
1. ‘Transgender’ and ‘trans’ are umbrella terms applied to people whose sense of
themselves as gendered people (gender identity) is in some way incongruent with the
gender assigned to them at birth, where assigned gender is typically based on the
medical perception of external genitalia (Burdge, 2007).
2. A resident of NSW who was born overseas may apply to the NSW Registrar of
Births, Deaths and Marriages for registration of their sex [sic]. Upon registration of a
change of sex the person may apply to the Registrar for issue of a recognized details
certificate: Births Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW), Pt 5A.
3. Other countries have recently changed their laws to allow recognition of sex/
gender identities other than male or female, including Nepal, India, Bangladesh, and
Pakistan (see, e.g. Bochenek & Knight, 2012).
4. ACT: Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997 (ACT), s 25(1)(a).
NSW: Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW), s 32C. Passports:
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Cth), n.d. Federal records: Australian
Government, 2013, para. 24.
5. As of 2016, there have been 18 unsuccessful attempts in the Federal Parliament
to legalize same-sex marriage (McKeown, 2016). At the time of going to print, the
Australian Government is preparing to conduct a non-binding, nation-wide survey on
the issue of same-sex marriage (Sainty, 2017).
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